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1. Introduction and Statement 
1.1. Introduction  
Facing an adverse event (an earthquake, a 
hurricane, a malicious action, the failure of a 
machine, etc.), managers of an entity (a 
physical system, a human organization, etc.) 
will be concerned with the impact on their 
objectives or stakes that we will generically 
refer to as their desires in this paper. These 
desires are the main issues that will guide 
actions which managers may consider in order 
to reduce as much as possible the negative 
impact of the event. But the outcomes of these 
actions are always subject to uncertainty 
creating then a risky situation. So risk can be 
defined as the uncertainty of the consequences 
or outcomes of events and/or actions. To 
correctly address uncertainties mainly in terms 
of mathematical tools to represent them, we 
need to know their nature.  
Roughly, there are three types of uncertainties 
briefly explained below. 
Epistemic uncertainty: this type of uncertainty is 
due to incomplete knowledge and it ranges from 
deterministic knowledge to complete total 
ignorance; for instance the question "are 
genetically modified organisms dangerous for 
human being?" is subjected to epistemic 
uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty can be 
reduced or transformed to variability uncertainty 
provided that the analyst or decision maker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
disposes of time and/or resources to do studies 
or to observe the system; decision making 
problems where this type of uncertainty also 
known as severe uncertainty occurs are 
generally solved by worst case analysis or 
Wald's maxi/min principle [23]; we are not 
going to address this kind of uncertainty in   
this paper. 
Variability uncertainty is due to the inherent 
variability in the behaviour of some 
components of a decision making problem 
(environment, humans, outcomes, etc.). The 
uncertainty related to a question such as "what 
will be the magnitude of the next earthquake in 
Japan?" can be considered to be subjected to 
variability uncertainty. Contrary to epistemic 
uncertainty, variability uncertainty is not 
reducible and must be adequately addressed by 
mathematical tool in any rational decision 
making problem. The appropriate mathematical 
tool to manage variability uncertainty is the 
theory of probability and its connected 
graphical tools such as Bayesian networks and 
influence diagrams [9, 14]. 
Fuzzy uncertainty: this uncertainty comes 
mainly from the impossibility of humans to 
precisely define events or variables and/or the 
fuzzy discretization of continuous variables. 
Indeed, humans usually express their opinions 
in terms of linguistic variables such as: this is a 
tall person, this season we expect our sale to be 
high, etc. The mathematical tool to address 
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fuzzy uncertainty is naturally the fuzzy set 
theory (see [21]). 
In this paper we will be concerned by 
variability and fuzzy uncertainties. 
Integration of risk factors in decision making or 
risk informed decision making is receiving a 
great attention by researchers and decision 
makers in many domains such as engineering 
(designing technical systems that mitt some 
requirements in terms of safety), finance (set up 
norms to monitor finance activities in order to 
avoid companies collapse), environment 
(develop sustainable agriculture and natural 
resources extraction actions), science and 
medical research (monitoring scientists activity 
by the society to avoid creating new threats) 
because national and international opinions are 
being more and more sensible to risk issues 
from all human activities. The purpose of this 
paper is to develop a risk management 
framework and a generic model that can be 
used to support making and planning pre-
active, reactive or proactive decisions.  
Pre-active decisions: these decisions consist in 
doing things to prepare the entity under 
consideration to face potential adverse events 
(one knows that such events will occur soon or 
later). Actions such as transferring risk by 
contracting insurances, editing anti-seismic 
construction norms in the case of natural 
disasters or prudential norms such as those of 
Bâle II (see for instance [22]) concerning 
banking activities, preparing population on how 
to behave in the case of an earthquake, 
constructing and organizing emergency 
facilities, etc. are pre-active decisions. 
Reactive decisions: reactive decisions consist in 
real time actions when the adversary events are 
present; decide which emergency unit will be 
affected to which zone or region during an 
earthquake; which credit to reduce by a 
government when an unplanned event such as 
petrol price raise occurs, renegotiating contracts 
with partners when they fail to realize their 
duties or redirecting activities in a supply chain 
for instance, etc. constitute reactive decisions. 
Pro-active decisions: they consist in things that 
must be undertaken to force a particular 
situation (avoiding catastrophic situation for 
instance). Risk prevention using redundancy 
for instance (to avoid the failure of a function 
or component in an industrial system), 
destroying or weakening terrorist groups such 
as Al Quaida by military actions in order to 
prevent events like that of 9/11  participate to 
such proactive decisions. 
Risk and uncertainty are fundamental elements 
of modern life so they must be managed 
effectively to protect people from injury and to 
permit the development of reliable, high-quality 
products. Today an ever-increasing number of 
professionals and managers in industry, 
government, and academia are devoting a larger 
portion of their time and resources to the task of 
improving their approach to, and understanding 
of, risk-based decision making [7, 10]. Indeed, 
decision making under uncertainty (risk) literally 
encompasses every facet, dimension, and aspect 
of our lives. Any decision maker needs to cope 
with uncertainty in order to rationally act in the 
sense of risks reduction. To correctly and 
scientifically address risk management process, 
one needs a precise definition and measure of 
risk; this is the object of next paragraph.   
1.2. Risk definition and measure  
Risk is jointly associated with the likelihood 
(probability) of something (an event or a 
sequence of events) happening and the negative 
impact (severity) on the entity which arises if it 
does actually happen. As stated previously the 
impact will be considered with regard to the 
entity managers desires. So to formerly define 
the risk, let us consider that when facing an 
adverse event X entity managers have identified 
a finite discrete set D of desires. The measure 
Rd(X) of the risk for a desire d with regard to an 
adverse event X is consequently formed by two 
components: the likelihood Pr(X) of the event 
X (probability of occurrence) and the severity 
Sd(X) (a conditional measure of the extent to 
which the desire d will not be satisfied if event 
X actually happens). The severity depends on 
the entity state that is all things that make it 
being vulnerable or resilient with regards to the 
adverse event. These components are such that 
if one of them is given, the risk is 
commensurate to the another and there is no 
risk if one of them is null; indeed, if an event is 
almost impossible (Pr(X) ≈ 0)) it does not 
matter if its severity is high or not and a highly 
probable event does not matter if its severity 
can be neglected (Sd(X) ≈ 0). Thus the measure 
Rd(X) of the risk on desire d with regard to 
event X is given by equation (1) below. 
)Pr()()( XXSXR dd   (1) 
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The severity measures conditional negative 
impact on the desire and generally expressed by 
the amount of some losses (economic loss, 
lives loss, etc.) or by the probability of it being 
not satisfied; desire that may be formulated as a 
constraint on some consequences of. When 
severity is considered to be the conditional 
probability of no satisfaction of desire knowing 
the event X, that is )(XS d  is given by 
equation (2). 
 XdXS d /Pr)(   (2) 
the risk corresponds to the joint probability of 
the occurrence of event X and non satisfaction 
of desire d, that is )(XRd  will be reduced to 
equation (3). 
 dXXXSXR dd ,Pr)Pr()()(   (3) 
The global risk R(X) for the entity given the 
event X will be obtained by aggregating risks 
related to all desires as shown by equation      
(4) below. 
 )()( XRXR dD  (4) 
where D  is an aggregating operator over the 
desires set D.  
Many approaches, see [4], exist to construct 
aggregation operator D  ranging from simple 
weighted sum to more sophisticated approach 
that take into account some interaction between 
measures to aggregate, see [5]. One such 
approach known to cope with synergy (when 
some measures are complementary) between 
measures, redundancy (the case where some 
measures are substitutable) and independency 
between measures is the Choquet integral [3]. 
The following definition gives necessary 
materials to compute this overall risk as a 
Choquet integral.  
Definition: Let D2  be the power set of D, a 
function  1,02: D  is a capacity or a fuzzy 
measure over D if it verifies: 
 
 
   
) 0,
) 1,
) , ,
i
ii D
iii A B D A B if A B


 
 

   
 (5) 
Given a capacity   over the set of desires D, 
the global risk R(X) is given by the Choquet 
integral associated to this capacity as given by 
the following equation (6) 
   


D
d
d
dd AXRXRXR
1
)(
)1()( )()()( 
   (6) 
where D  is the cardinality of the set D,   is a 
permutation over D such that  
    DddAandD  ...,),1(),(...)2()1(0   
The difficulty of computing Choquet integral is 
to define a fuzzy measure over the set D that 
necessitates obtaining 22 D  coefficients 
that represent the measure of subsets of D other 
than   and D. This can be done by experts if 
the set D is not too large otherwise, by some 
practical considerations, such as k-additive 
fuzzy measure, one can obtain this integral with 
less computational effort through interaction 
indices for instance [5].  
Now that risk and its measure are defined, we 
consider the way to manage it. The process of 
coping with risks in running an entity is 
twofold: be aware of what kind of risks the 
entity can face (risk assessment) and what can 
be done to reduce the overall impact of those 
risks (risk management); these two issues will 
be considered in the following paragraph.  
1.3. Risk assessment and management 
Assessment process is a purely analytic activity 
where the analyst is willing to characterize the 
risks faced by an entity by following some 
procedures. In risk assessment, the analyst 
often attempts to answer the following set of 
triple questions. 
What can go wrong? Answers to this question 
will permit to identify all events or sequence of 
events (or scenarios) that have an (negative) 
effect on the entity. 
What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? 
This is the quantification process to estimate 
probability of occurrence of formerly identified 
risk factors or events.  
And, what are the consequences? Answers to 
this question permit to identify and estimate the 
possible negative impact on the entity 
(complete failure of a system, approximate 
running of a system, serious disorganization of 
an organization, dangerous situation for users, 
etc.) if the undesired events do occur. These 
consequences result from the events as well as 
the state of the entity; the state of an entity here 
consists in all things (cognitive, physical, 
organizational, architectural, sensitivity, 
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adaptive capacity, etc.) that make it vulnerable 
or in contrary resilient to undesirable events. 
Answers to these triple questions help risk 
analysts identify, measure, quantify, and 
evaluate risks and their consequences and 
categorize the risk factors (adverse events).  In 
general the categorization of risk factor is done 
as given on Figure 1 where we have:  critical 
events (either frequent and severe events), these 
events must be seriously monitored; frequent 
but not severe events (one may consider 
reducing their frequency by improving the 
technology of related components in a system 
for instance); severe but not frequent events 
(one may consider actions that prevent their 
impact by organizing the architecture of the 
system to tolerate related faults); not critical 
events (not frequent nor severe events, no real 
danger concerning these events) 
Formalized tools such as that developed in 
dependability engineering namely, FMECA 
(Failures Modes, their Effects and Criticity 
Analysis), fault tree analysis, reliability 
diagrams and many other specialized 
approaches, see for instance [1, 4, 17, 18, 19], 
can be useful for risk assessment purpose . 
 
If being aware of risks that an entity is facing 
(risk assessment) is a necessary non avoidable 
condition, being able to act to reduce this risk 
(risk management, acting in the sense of arrows 
shown on Figure 1, rendering all events not 
critical) is probably the better thing to do; in the 
following paragraph risk management process 
will be formulated.  
Risk management is decision making under 
uncertainty using quantified measure of the 
later [16] and its objective is to investigate the 
trade-off between the conveniences and the 
consequences. Risk management builds on the 
risk assessment process by seeking answers to a 
second set of three questions: 
What can be done and what options are 
available? The answer to this question permit 
to identify a finite discrete set A of possible 
actions that can be undertaken to either mitigate 
the risk (reducing the severity) or to prevent the 
risk (reducing the likelihood) or both of them. 
Notice that depending on the nature of the 
events some of these actions may be 
impossible; for instance it is not possible to 
prevent a natural risk such as an earthquake; 
these risks can be just mitigated by taking 
appropriate actions such as respecting seismic 
norms when constructing infrastructures and 
buildings and/or preparing population to have 
good reflex when necessary.  
What are the associated trade-offs, in terms of 
all costs and benefits and constraints in the 
realization of actions identified in the    
previous point? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And what are the impacts of the undertaken 
management actions on future options. 
In the next section, we will expose the 
framework we are proposing to support risk 
management decision making process 
 
S(X)
Pr(X)
Frequent but 
not severe events
Critical events
(frequent and severe)
Not critical events
(not frequent and not severe)
Severe but 
not frequent events
Risk mitigation
Risk prevention  
Figure 1. Risk factors categorization and risk management actions typology 
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2. Proposed Framework 
As stated in introduction section, the purpose of 
the framework to be established is to be used as 
a decision support to plan and select 
appropriate actions or behaviour when facing 
an adverse event. To this end, the underlying 
model must be able to propagate a local 
evidence (a certain knowledge about the 
adverse event or about the state of the entity for 
instance) in order to evaluate the possible state 
of some other components (most probable level 
of some consequences for instance). 
Conversely the model must be able to find the 
most appropriate actions to consider given a 
local knowledge and the specification of 
decision maker in terms of his/her desires. A 
mathematical tool that is able to cope with 
these desires is Bayesian networks and their 
extension to influence diagrams. Thus before 
considering building the model, we will recall 
necessary materials of these tools in the 
following paragraph 
2.1. Modelling tool 
Bayesian Networks (BN) derive from 
convergence of statistical methods that permit 
one to go from information (data) to knowledge 
(probability laws, relationship between 
variables, etc.) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
that permit computers to deal with knowledge 
(not only information). The terminology BN 
comes from work by Thomas Bayes [2] in 
eighteenth century. Its actually development is 
due to [14]. The main purpose of BN is to 
integrate uncertainty in expert system. Indeed, 
an expert, most of the time, has only an 
approximate knowledge of the system that he 
or she formulates in terms like: A has an 
influence on B; if B is observed, there exists a 
great chance that C occurs; and so on. On the 
other hand, there are data (measurements for 
example) that contain some information which 
must be transformed into relationships between 
variables. Bayesian networks are graphical 
tools formed by nodes and arcs where nodes 
represent uncertain variables and arcs some 
relationships, see [9, 11, 12, 14].  
Influence diagrams are extension of Bayesian 
networks to allow evaluating alternative 
decisions and not only relationships as in BN. 
They are simple visual representation of a 
decision problem under uncertainty. Influence 
diagrams offer an intuitive way to identify and 
display the essential elements, including 
decisions, uncertainties, and preferences, and 
how they influence each other. It shows the 
dependencies among the variables more clearly 
than decision tree. An influence diagram or 
decision graph [6, 9] consists of a direct acyclic 
graph (DAG) known as its structure that depicts 
relationships among variables in a decision 
problem and conditional probabilities 
distribution of each node given evidence on its 
parents (nodes that have a direct arc into the 
considered node) known as its parameters. An 
influence diagram has 3 types of nodes as 
shown by Figure 2 with the following meanings 
(see [20]): 
 Decision node
Chance node
Value node
 
Figure 2. Nodes in an influence diagram 
- chance nodes (oval) represent uncertain 
variables (environment) that influence the 
decision problem; a BN is constituted only 
by chance nodes; 
- decision nodes (rectangle) represent 
choices open to decision maker ; 
- value nodes (diamond) represent attributes 
(most of the time numeric) the decision 
maker cares about. 
In influence diagrams, an arc or edge relating 
two chance nodes is called a relevancy arc 
because it indicates that the value of one 
variable (source node) is relevant to the 
probability distribution of the other node 
(destination node), arcs from decision nodes to 
chance nodes are known as influence arcs 
meaning that the decision influences the 
outcome of the chance node and arcs into 
decision nodes (from chance nodes) are called 
information arcs meaning that the outcome of 
the chance node will be known at the time 
decision is made. Decision nodes are ordered in 
time that is there is a direct link between all 
decision nodes. Finally, arcs from chance or 
decision nodes into value nodes represent 
functional links. Relevant arcs ma mean many 
things depending on the problem at hand such 
as: implication, correlation, causality, etc. 
The next section will present all the 
different variables that will be used by the 
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ultimate influence diagram model in the 
established framework.  
2.2. Variables identification 
To identify and define all the variables to be 
used in the risk management model (the 
ultimate influence diagram), we propose to 
follow the risk management flow chart depicted 
on Figure 3 that is explained in the following. 
 
First of all, the analyst or decision maker must 
identify all the risk factors, in fact all the events 
that may have a negative impact on the 
performance of the entity by using risk 
assessment approaches evoked previously. We 
consider that this process will lead to a finite 
discrete set E of events. 
The second stage consist in assessing the 
variables defining the state of the system that is 
identifying all the things (economic, social, 
technological, institutional, cognitive, cultural 
conditions, etc.) that influence the vulnerability 
or resiliency (capacity of the entity to resist or 
not to an adverse event) of the entity given an 
undesirable event; we consider that a finite 
discrete set S has been identified.  
In the third stage, one will evaluate the 
consequences (characterization of negative 
impact on the entity; complete failure of the 
system, approximate running of the system, 
dangerous situation for users, etc.) on the entity 
if some of the previous events do occur; these 
consequences depend also on the state of the 
entity. We consider that a finite discrete set C 
of consequences is identified. 
The fourth stage is dedicated to defining desires 
by decision maker; desires are things one want 
to affect through management decisions and 
actions; they define the criteria on which 
managements decisions will be based and 
consist most of the time in putting conditions or 
constraints over consequences (or aggregated 
indicators) such as damage cost during 
earthquake must be low, avoid power supply 
failure during an earthquake, etc. This process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
will generally lead to identify the previously 
mentioned desires set D. 
Finally control variables or management 
actions are defined; these are things that can be 
realized in order to achieve desires. Examples: 
respect anti-seismic norms when constructing; 
educate population with regard appropriate 
reaction to adopt during an earthquake; build 
modern facilities, etc. Once again, we consider 
that a finite discrete set A of actions is available 
to decision maker.  
2.2. Relationships identification 
To identify all the relationships that may exist 
between previously defined variables, we 
propose to use a meta-matrix analysis. The 
entry (I, J) of such a meta-matrix is a directed 
graph (see Figure 4) describing the influence of 
variables of set I on the variables of set J. 
I J  
Figure 4. Meta-graph 
The meta – matrix of our model is a 5×5 matrix 
of causality, influence, correlation, etc. graphs 
between previously identified sets E (events), S 
(entity state), C (consequences), D (desires) 
Desires, D
Entity state, SEvents, E
Consequences, C
Actions, A
1 2
3
4
5
 
Figure 3. Risk management process flow 
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and A (actions) as shown by the following 
Figure 5 where blank entries mean no direct 
influence of the corresponding sets. 
E S C D A
E E-E
graph
E-C
graph
S S-S
graph
S-C
graph
C C-C
graph
C-D
graph
D D-D
graph
A A-E
graph
A-S
graph
A-A
graph
 
Figure 5. Meta-matrix of the model 
 
These graphs are presented in the        
following points. 
Events graph (E-E graph): this graph defines 
causal relationships that may exist between 
events; to identify these relationships one must 
answer questions such as "which event may 
lead to which one?" For instance an earthquake 
may cause a tsunami or stones fall in  
mountains regions. 
State graph (S-S graph) represents potential 
influence that may exist between the variables 
defining the state of the entity. 
Consequences graph (C-C graph) defines 
relationships between consequences. For 
instance, human consequences during an 
earthquake may be decomposed into economic 
consequences, infrastructures consequences, 
cultural consequences, etc. To define this graph 
one can use a bottom up analysis, going from a 
particular consequence and identifying all the 
consequences that lead to it. 
Desires graph (D-D graph) is similar to 
consequences graph. 
Actions graph (A-A graph): this graph defines 
how one action may influence another one or 
how the success of an action may depend on 
another one. 
Events-Consequences graph (E-C graph) defines 
how uncontrollable variables representing events 
will impact the consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sate-Consequences graph (S-C graph): this 
graph signifies that the importance of 
consequences depend on the state of the entity 
in terms of vulnerability or resiliency.  
Consequences-Desires graph (C-D graph) is 
straightforward as desires are defined as 
conditions or constraints over consequences. 
Actions-Events graph (A-E graph): this graph 
represents the risk prevention actions as for 
some events there may exist actions that reduce 
their likelihood. 
Actions-State graph (A-S graph) describes how 
some actions influence the state of the entity; 
indeed this graph represents the risk mitigation 
actions effects. 
Control variables (actions)
(A-A graph)
Desires 
(D-D graph)
Constraints graph
Consequences 
(C-C graph)
Entity state 
(S-S graph)
Risk mitigation
Risk prevention
Risk assessment meta-model
Risk management meta-model
Non controllable variables (events)
(E-E graph)
A–E graph
A–S graph
E–C graph
S–C graph
C–D graph
 
Figure 6. Overall meta-model of considered risk management framework 
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From the meta-matrix, defining a meta-model 
in terms of meta-Bayesian network is 
straightforward and is given by Figure 6 where 
we add a constraints graph that has an influence 
on actions in order to take into account 
unavoidable resources limitation and other 
physical and feasibility requirements for actions.  
Of course when facing a real problem, the 
meta-model of Figure 6 must be instantiated 
with knowledgeable variables to obtain a real 
Bayesian network to support making decision. 
A Bayesian network is constituted by two 
components: its structure that is directly given 
by Figure 6 and its parameters that are 
conditional probability tables (in the case 
where nodes take discrete modalities) or 
conditional distribution functions (for 
continuous nodes) as well as a priori 
distributions for nodes that do not have parents. 
Thus, in front of a real problem, the analyst has 
to make hypothesis concerning the nature of 
nodes. In this paper we consider only discrete 
nodes because Bayesian networks with discrete 
nodes are those easily handle by existing 
algorithms for learning and inference (see [9, 
11]) and also because the framework we are 
building will be dedicated to high level 
managers that reason most of the time in terms 
of macro variables and tendency rather than 
precise numbers. Another reason for adopting 
discrete nodes is that most of the time experts’ 
knowledge is required to elicit conditional 
probability distribution and these experts 
express their knowledge fuzzily which fuzzy 
measures can be translated to probability by 
appropriate approaches such as pignistic 
probability approach, see [15]. So, all 
continuous variables will be discretized using 
possibly fuzzy discretization.  
2.3. Usage of the model 
The overall model can be used in two senses: 
deductive or inductive. In deductive sense, by 
specifying some local evidence in the model, 
one can propagate it using inference algorithms 
of Baysian networks to estimate the resultant 
risk Rd(X) on each desire d and then aggregate 
them by means of equation (6) to obtain the 
overall resultant risk R(X). In inductive sense, by 
giving some requirements concerning acceptable 
risk for each desire, one can back propagate this 
information to determine the most appropriate 
actions to set up. One must notice that this 
model can be used by portion in the sense that 
the user can be interested in only a subset of 
variables and do the propagations processes.  
3. Illustrative Example 
To illustrate the approach presented so far, we 
consider a problem of developing a model that 
can be used by authorities of a country or a 
region (that may face an earthquake events) to 
support making sound decisions before, during 
and after an earthquake. This is a preliminary 
analysis which purpose is to show that steps 
and tools presented previously can be used 
effectively; variables and their categories that 
will be presented in the following paragraphs 
are developed by the author as a first attempt. 
The methodology presented is obviously 
multidisciplinary, be it to identify relevant 
variables and relationships or to characterize 
their strength by conditional probabilities. In 
the following paragraphs, we will apply the 
steps described on the flow chart of Figure 3 to 
identify some variables that can be used to 
assess or manage risk related to an earthquake 
event; we do not pretend to exhaustiveness and 
the adopted clustering in terms of 
consequences, state of the system, actions or 
desires may raise objections but we do think 
that this study can easily be adapted by a 
multidisciplinary team for a real world project. 
3.1 Variables and relationships 
3.1.1. Events. As it is shown on Figure 3, the 
first step in risk management process we have 
proposed is to identify potential adverse events; 
here the main event is the earthquake and 
subsidiary it can cause others events such as a 
tsunami. Earthquake is the principal event and 
it can be characterized in the framework of a 
Bayesian network by a discrete variable which 
modalities or status can be determined using 
Richter scale for instance. A tsunami can result 
from an earthquake so that earthquake is a 
causal event for a tsunami in the structure of E-
E graph. Tsunami can be evaluated by a binary 
modalities (Yes/No) or by more modalities 
such as Very Huge/Huge/Medium/Small. These 
later characterization may result from a (fuzzy) 
discretization of a physical parameter such as 
the energy or the mass of water displaced by 
the tsunami. 
3.1.2. Entity state characterization. The 
second step of the chart on Figure 3 is to 
characterize the state of the entity (here the 
strength and weakness of the region under 
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consideration with regard to earthquake events 
and other possible conditions). We consider that 
the state of the system can be described by the 
following variables that obviously will impact on 
the consequences of an earthquake in a region. Of 
course one can imagine many other variables and 
the process of identifying these variables in a real 
world application will certainly be carried up by a 
multidisciplinary team. 
Population awareness of the phenomenon: 
this is a qualitative appreciation of how well 
the concerned population know that an 
earthquake can occur in the region; indeed a 
well prepared population will probably adopt a 
good behaviour during an earthquake than a 
non prepared one. In the framework of 
Bayesian networks, this variable is a discrete 
variable that can be evaluated on a Yes/No 
scale or a more elaborated scale such as 
Good/Medium/Low. 
Infrastructure conditions: a region where 
infrastructures (buildings, roads, dams, etc.) are 
built when respecting anti-seismic norms will 
probably resist better during an earthquake than 
a region that does not respect these norms. This 
variable may be hierarchically decomposed into 
other variables (age of the infrastructure, usage 
of the infrastructure, etc.) which modalities are 
easier to define. 
Emergency systems: this variable describes the 
quantity and qualities of resources developed 
by the region authorities to monitor adverse 
events (network of sensors to detect tectonic 
movements, geographic information systems, 
communication systems, etc.) and to efficiently 
react during an event (emergency equipment, 
quality and quantity of emergency trained 
agents, etc.). As for infrastructure conditions 
variable, this one also can be considered as a 
macro-variable that can be decomposed into 
many more measurable variables. 
Education level: a well educated population 
will be more receptive to prescribed behaviour 
during an earthquake than a non educated one. 
This variable in terms of Bayesian network will 
be a parent of the variable population 
awareness and can be evaluated on a discrete 
scale such High/Medium/Low that could be a 
fuzzy discretization of a continuous variable 
such as the proportion of the population that 
earn a certain degree for instance. 
3.1.3. Consequences characterization. Once 
events and the state of the system are defined, 
one can consider identifying consequences that 
may occur in response to an event. The 
consequences of an earthquake event are 
certainly multiples; here is an attempt to 
categorize them in terms of economic, social, 
infrastructures and environmental consequences. 
3.1.3.1. Economic consequences: economic 
consequences consist in immediate 
consequences and long term consequences; 
here is a non exhaustive list. 
Loss of jobs and know how: this can be 
considered to be a mean/long term 
consequence; after an earthquake many people 
will probably loose their jobs because of 
damage caused to their working infrastructures 
and lives loss will result in loss of know how in 
long term. This is a macro-variable. 
Macro-economic consequences: destruction of 
industrial infrastructures and others will lead to 
negative macro-economic consequences; this 
variable obviously will be decomposed into 
other variables in real case and can be 
considered to be a descendant of the previous 
variable Loss of jobs and know how.  
Relocation (of population) cost: this is an 
immediate consequence that will be influenced 
by some variables related to emergency 
systems and infrastructure conditions of the 
state of the entity and though it is naturally a 
continuous variables, it will be discretized in 
natural language (Very 
high/High/Medium/Low for instance) for sake 
of communication. 
Evacuation (of population) cost: this is also an 
immediate consequence as the previous one 
and will be characterized almost in the same 
way, etc. 
3.1.3.2. Social consequences: as economic 
consequences, one can imagine many social 
consequences such as those listed in           
the following. 
Lives loss: this is normally a continuous 
variable that will be fuzzily discretized to have 
a linguistic scale. It will depend on some state 
of the entity variables and other consequences 
(consequences on buildings for instance). 
Impact on the revenue: economic 
consequences such as jobs loss will lead to a 
reduction in revenue of the population that will 
increase social dependency for instance. 
Impact on the social dependency: as stated in 
the previous point, reduction in the revenue 
may increase social dependency among          
the population. 
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Impact on education level: lives loss, revenue 
reduction and social dependency may lead to a 
negative impact on the education level. 
Post event social consequences: these 
consequences could consist in changes in 
cultural habits (migration of people from rural 
area to towns that will raise some problem such 
as criminality) or an impact on the structure of 
the population (reduction of active members of 
the population), etc. 
3.1.3.3. Infrastructure consequences. 
Consequences on buildings: damages caused 
to building will depend on the intensity of the 
earthquake as well as the nature of the 
buildings (are the buildings constructed when 
respecting anti-seismic norms or not?) and they 
will impact on lives loss that will depend on the 
usage of the building (office, home, industrial 
building, etc.). These consequences can be 
evaluated over scales defined by existing norms 
such as that of Eurocode (see for instance [24]). 
Loss of energy infrastructures: this variable, 
that will be a descendant of variables such as 
dams, power plants, power lines, etc., will 
influence socioeconomic consequences 
variables such as macro-economic 
consequences, jobs loss, etc. In terms of 
Bayesian networks it will be evaluated over a 
discrete scale. 
Loss of communication resources: the loss of 
communication infrastructures such as roads, 
bridges, airports, ports or electronic 
communication infrastructures will result in 
negative socioeconomic consequences such as 
goods getting expensive or jobs loss because of 
lake of row materials to run industries. 
3.1.4. Environmental consequences. Some 
resulted events from an earthquake such as 
tsunami, floods or fire or consequences such as 
explosion of chemical plants or nuclear power 
plants for instance may conduce to negative 
consequences on the environmental resources; 
here is some of those potential consequences. 
Impact on water resources: contamination of 
rivers and underground water by dangerous 
products from an exploded chemical or nuclear 
plants. This variable will have an impact on 
economic and social consequences mainly in 
the rural area and can be considered as a 
macro-variable that can be decomposed into 
more measurable variables. 
Impact on agriculture resources: flooded area 
may become impracticable for agriculture or 
crops may be destroyed by fire, floods or a 
tsunami. This impact will ultimately affect 
economic and social consequences. 
Climate consequences: destruction of forests 
by fire resulted from an earthquake or by a 
tsunami can have a long term consequences on 
the climate of the considered region that in 
return will impact on long term social and 
economic consequences. 
3.1.5. Actions identification. According to the 
nature of the adverse event (an earthquake that is 
a matter of nature), only risk mitigation actions 
can be implemented. These actions will act on 
some of the variables of the state of the entity to 
reduce negative consequences. Given former 
identified variables of the state of the system, 
here are some actions that can be imagined. 
Prepare population, this action could take 
different forms: educate the population; inform 
and train population to have a good behaviour 
in the case of an earthquake. 
Set up and organize emergency systems: create 
a network of sensors to pre-detect an earthquake 
event in order to alert population by different 
media; train qualitatively and quantitatively 
agents for reactive response; equip emergency 
agencies with good materials, etc. 
Prepare after event: constitute a fund or 
subscribe insurance to face after events problems. 
Take legislative decisions: vote laws and 
norms to be respected when constructing some 
infrastructures (buildings, dames, power plants, 
roads, bridges, etc.); force individuals and 
companies to contract risk insurances, etc. 
3.1.6. Desires formulation. Risk management 
desires here will consist in implementing 
actions in order to reduce the level of some 
negative consequences so that desires may be 
defined by thresholds on consequences level or 
constraints satisfaction by some consequences: 
have low level lives loss, prevent 
infrastructures collapse, prevent occurrence of 
hunger, etc. 
3.1.7. Constraints specification. Constraints 
may be subdivided into different fields such as 
those given below. 
Financial constraints: the considered country 
or region may face serious financial resources 
limitation in order to undertake actions       
defined previously. 
Technical constraints: the region or country 
may lack technical skills to train emergency 
agents; to construct and organize an efficiency 
emergency system; to design and construct 
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adequate infrastructures. These constraints are 
directly influenced by financial constraints that 
constitute then a parent node in the framework 
of Bayesian network. 
Geographic constraints: the accessibility of a 
region that face a natural disaster by emergency 
resources may be very difficult (mountains 
region for instance). 
 
Period of the day: according to the period of the 
day an earthquake takes place it will be more or 
less easy to organize emergency systems and 
rescue people. This variable will be evaluated 
naturally by modalities such as morning, 
afternoon, night, etc. in a Bayesian network. 
3.2 An instance of the model 
Once variables are identified and their 
relationships sketched, one can consider 
building the entire model. This can be done by 
implementing existing Bayesian network 
learning and inference algorithms [9, 11] to 
construct one’s own decision support system or 
one can use existing decision support software 
based on Bayesian network technology such as 
that of [8, 13], the principal ones in our 
knowledge. Figure 7 shows an extract of a 
model (built using Nertica) that could be set up 
to support decision making and planning 
regarding risk related to an earthquake event in 
a building; the focused consequence in this 
extracted model is human damage. Notice that 
variables in this model can be considered as 
macro variables that can be decomposed into 
more elementary variables depending on the 
level of abstraction decision makers accept. We 
did not find it necessary to consider specifying 
modalities of variables nor conditional 
probability tables as this is just an illustration 
of what can be obtained as structure of a risk 
management decision model in a particular 
case using the developed approach. When 
necessary, by using a team of experts, 
specification of these parameters can be done  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
without major difficulties and value nodes can 
be added so that one can optimize or prioritize 
actions by simulation. 
4. Conclusion 
A generic framework and model to support 
managing risks related to variability and fuzzy 
uncertainties has been considered in this paper. 
A procedure based on questions – responses 
has been proposed to identify all the variables 
(risk factors, state of the entity under 
consideration, possible consequences, possible 
risk reduction actions) impacting decision-
making process. Then, a meta-matrix analysis 
is proposed to identify relationships between 
these variables and to assess their strength. As 
the main purpose of the established model is to 
aid decision maker making inductive and 
deductive analysis for pre-active, reactive, and 
proactive decisions making, this model must be 
able to propagate local evidence through the 
variables to assess or identify most suitable 
status of some interested variables. To respond 
to this later concern, Bayesian networks and 
influence diagrams have been chosen as the 
underlying mathematical tools of the 
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Figure 7. Example of an instance 
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established framework. Fuzzy integral, namely 
Choquet integral (that permits to take into 
account interactions between aggregated 
parameters) is used for aggregation purpose in 
order to present managers with concise 
information. Though the illustrative example 
we have presented concerns decision-making in 
relation with a natural disaster (earthquake), the 
established framework is much general to be 
applied or adapted for risk management in 
other domains such supply chain, food 
industry, banking and finance, engineering, 
medical to name few. Future works will focus 
on applying this approach to a real world 
problem and developing useful computers 
applications based on this framework. 
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